Models of Control and Moral Responsibility
Two-Day Workshop which brings together philosophers, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists to address basic questions about the relationship between control and moral responsibility.
Intuitively, a person is morally responsible for her actions only if she exercises the right kind of control in the performance. But what does it mean to fulfil this control condition? How does control - or the lack thereof - affect attributions of moral responsibility? Do people from different fields refer to the same thing, when they talk of control? Are psychological and neuroscientific notions of control consistent with philosophical theories about the conditions of responsibility? These questions are fundamental for the way we understand and investigate the psychological conditions of responsible action.
The aim of the workshop is to engage in a discussion about an empirically consistent and theoretically coherent notion of control and its relation to moral responsibility.
- Marcel Brass, Cognitive Neuroscience, Ghent University
- Felipe de Brigard, Philosophy, Duke University
- Thor Grünbaum, Philosophy, University of Copenhagen
- Bernhard Hommel, Psychology, Leiden University
- Annemarie Kalis, Philosophy, Utrecht University
- Søren Kyllingsbæk, Psychology, University of Copenhagen
- Alfred Mele, Philosophy, Florida State University
- Agnes Moors, Psychology, KU Leuven
- Timothy Schroeder, Philosophy, Rice University
- Chandra Sripada, Psychiatry and Philosophy, University of Michigan
Attendance is free, but the number of seats is limited.
To apply for a seat, please send an email with a short statement of motivation for participating and details about your institutional affiliation and position to Filippos Stamatiou including details about your institutional affiliation and position.