Epistemology and Empirical Investigation

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  • Kristoffer Ahlström
Recently, Hilary Kornblith has argued that epistemological investigation is substantially empirical. In the present paper, I will ¿rst show that his claim is not contingent upon the further and, admittedly, controversial assumption that all objects of epistemological investigation are natural kinds. Then, I will argue that, contrary to what Kornblith seems to assume, this methodological contention does not imply that there is no need for attending to our epistemic concepts in epistemology. Understanding the make-up of our concepts and, in particular, the purposes they ¿ll, is necessary for a proper acknowledgment of epistemology’s role in conceptual improvement
Original languageEnglish
Book seriesGrazer Philosophische Studien
Volume76
Pages (from-to)109-134
Number of pages26
ISSN0165-9227
Publication statusPublished - 2008

ID: 14069770