Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life: A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

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Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life : A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu. / Christiansen, Andreas.

In: Bioethics, Vol. 30, No. 5, 11.05.2016, p. 372-379.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Christiansen, A 2016, 'Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life: A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu', Bioethics, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 372-379. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12248

APA

Christiansen, A. (2016). Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life: A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu. Bioethics, 30(5), 372-379. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12248

Vancouver

Christiansen A. Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life: A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu. Bioethics. 2016 May 11;30(5):372-379. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12248

Author

Christiansen, Andreas. / Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life : A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu. In: Bioethics. 2016 ; Vol. 30, No. 5. pp. 372-379.

Bibtex

@article{7e1137efa4704b13bceacaa61f301217,
title = "Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life: A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu",
abstract = "I discuss the moral significance of artificial life within synthetic biology via a discussion of Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's paper 'Is the creation of artificial life morally significant{\textquoteright}. I argue that the definitions of 'artificial life{\textquoteright} and of 'moral significance{\textquoteright} are too narrow. Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's definition of artificial life does not capture all core projects of synthetic biology or the ethical concerns that have been voiced, and their definition of moral significance fails to take into account the possibility that creating artificial life is conditionally acceptable. Finally, I show how several important objections to synthetic biology are plausibly understood as arguing that creating artificial life in a wide sense is only conditionally acceptable.",
author = "Andreas Christiansen",
year = "2016",
month = may,
day = "11",
doi = "10.1111/bioe.12248",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "372--379",
journal = "Bioethics",
issn = "0269-9702",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life

T2 - A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu

AU - Christiansen, Andreas

PY - 2016/5/11

Y1 - 2016/5/11

N2 - I discuss the moral significance of artificial life within synthetic biology via a discussion of Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's paper 'Is the creation of artificial life morally significant’. I argue that the definitions of 'artificial life’ and of 'moral significance’ are too narrow. Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's definition of artificial life does not capture all core projects of synthetic biology or the ethical concerns that have been voiced, and their definition of moral significance fails to take into account the possibility that creating artificial life is conditionally acceptable. Finally, I show how several important objections to synthetic biology are plausibly understood as arguing that creating artificial life in a wide sense is only conditionally acceptable.

AB - I discuss the moral significance of artificial life within synthetic biology via a discussion of Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's paper 'Is the creation of artificial life morally significant’. I argue that the definitions of 'artificial life’ and of 'moral significance’ are too narrow. Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's definition of artificial life does not capture all core projects of synthetic biology or the ethical concerns that have been voiced, and their definition of moral significance fails to take into account the possibility that creating artificial life is conditionally acceptable. Finally, I show how several important objections to synthetic biology are plausibly understood as arguing that creating artificial life in a wide sense is only conditionally acceptable.

UR - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bioe.12248/abstract

U2 - 10.1111/bioe.12248

DO - 10.1111/bioe.12248

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 26833578

VL - 30

SP - 372

EP - 379

JO - Bioethics

JF - Bioethics

SN - 0269-9702

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 149033048