TY - JOUR

T1 - Seeing what I am doing

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - I argue against the view that an agent’s knowledge of her own current action cannot in any way rely on perception for its justification. Instead, I argue that when it comes to an agent’s knowledge of her own object-oriented intentional action, the agent’s belief about what she is doing is partly justified by her perception of the object of action. I proceed by first proposing an account of such actions according to which the agent’s knowledge is partly justified by her perception. I then discuss several of objections to my proposal. The most important objection is that I have only managed to show that perception plays an enabling role and not a justificatory role for the agent’s knowledge of her own intentional action

AB - I argue against the view that an agent’s knowledge of her own current action cannot in any way rely on perception for its justification. Instead, I argue that when it comes to an agent’s knowledge of her own object-oriented intentional action, the agent’s belief about what she is doing is partly justified by her perception of the object of action. I proceed by first proposing an account of such actions according to which the agent’s knowledge is partly justified by her perception. I then discuss several of objections to my proposal. The most important objection is that I have only managed to show that perception plays an enabling role and not a justificatory role for the agent’s knowledge of her own intentional action

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - philosophy of action

KW - intention

KW - knowledge of Action

KW - demonstratives

KW - attention

U2 - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00647.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00647.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 86

SP - 295

EP - 318

JO - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

JF - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

SN - 0031-8205

IS - 2

ER -